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less, such considerations did not oper-
ate to dissolve the court's power to hear 
the case at bar. 
The Court also rejected the 
Government's contention that, because 
funds deposited in the United States 
Treasury may be released only by a 
congressional appropriation under Art. 
I, § 9, Cl. 7 of the United States Consti-
tution, any judgment handed down 
would necessarily be "useless" within 
the meaning of the exception to appel-
late jurisdiction discussed above. Id. at 
560. The Court reasoned that in 31 
U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) Congress has pro-
vided for the refund of funds that are 
erroneously received. Id. In addition, 
28 U.S.C. § 2465 states that property 
seized under any act of Congress shall 
be returned following the disposition of 
judgment in the defendant's favor. 
Under the Court's interpretation ofthese 
statutes, a formal appropriation would 
not be required under these circum-
stances. Id. at 561. Because the funds 
would be returned to their rightful owner 
following a favorable judgment, the 
Court concluded that a decision in the 
bank's favor would thus be enforce-
able. Id. 
Justice Thomas, in a concurring 
opinion, stated that he would have ap-
plied § 1521 of the Housing and Com-
munity Development Act of 1992, 106 
Stat. 3672, which amended 28 V.S.c. § 
1355. Section 1521, which the Presi-
dent signed on October 28, 1992, pro-
vides that the removal of property by a 
prevailing party in a civil forfeiture 
action does not deprive the appellate 
court of jurisdiction in the matter. The 
majority expressly declined to interpret 
the statute or to determine its retroac-
tive effect. Republic National Bank of 
Miami, 113 S. Ct. at 560 n.5. Justice 
Thomas, however, believed the Court 
should have applied the principle rec-
ognized in United States v. Alabama, 
362 U.S. 602 (1960), that new laws 
which enlarge jurisdiction apply to cases 
currently pending before a court. 
Republic National Bank of Miami 
v. United States represents a refusal by 
the Court to curtail the right of property 
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owners to appeal an adverse decision in 
civil forfeiture proceedings brought by 
the Government. In declining to inter-
pret the retroactive effect of § 1521 of 
the Housing and Conununity Develop-
ment Act of 1992, the Court indicated 
that, even absent such a statute, it would 
not pernlit tl1e Government to escape a 
full adjudication of a civil forfeiture 
claim on technical procedural grounds. 
Based on this decision, owners of prop-
erty seized by the Government pursuant 
to 21 V.S.C. § 881(a)(6) will beguar-
an teed the right to appeal a district 
court ruling forfeiting title to their prop-
erty to the United States. 
-Scott N Alperin 
Crosby v. United States: CRIMI-
NAL TRIAL MAY NOT PROCEED 
IF DEFENDANT IS NOT 
PRESENT AT COMMENCE-
MENT OF TRIAL. 
In Crosby v. United States, 113 S. 
Ct. 748 (1993), the United States Su-
preme Court held that Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 43 prohibits a trial 
in absentia of a defendant who is not 
present at the commencement of trial. 
In arriving at this holding, the Court 
examined the express language, the his-
tory, and the logic of the Rule. 
Michael Crosby and others were 
indicted on several counts of mail fraud 
by a federal grandjury in the District of 
Minnesota. He and his codefendants 
were accused of devising a scheme to 
fraudulently sell military-veteran com-
memorative medallions. Crosby ap-
peared before a federal magistrate and 
pleaded not guilty. He was condition-
ally released from detention upon agree-
ing to post a bond and remain in the 
state. He attended pretrial conferences 
and hearings with his attorney and was 
advised of the trial date. 
Crosby, however, did not appear for 
his trial in the United States District 
Court for the District of Minnesota. 
Deputy marshals attempted to locate 
him but were unsuccessful. The court 
expressed concern over the delay be-
cause the pool of potential jurors was 
waiting and the delay could have inter-
fered with the court's calendar. The 
prosecutor noted that Crosby's attor-
ney and codefendants were present and 
that it would be difficult for her to 
reschedule the case due to the age and 
health problems of some of the wit-
nesses. 
The district court suggested that the 
trial begin despite Crosby's absence, 
and Crosby's attorney objected. TIle 
Governnlent fOfl1lally requested that the 
trial conunence because Crosby was 
still not located after several days of 
search, and Crosby's bond was for-
feited. 
The court stated for the record its 
findings that Crosby had adequate no-
tice of the trial and that his absence was 
knowing and deliberate. It fu rther stated 
that trying Crosby separately from his 
codefendants would present problems 
for the Government, witnesses, coun-
sel, and court. The court concl uded that 
Crosby had voluntarily waived his con-
stitutional right to be present during the 
trial and that the public interest in pro-
ceeding with trial in his absence out-
weighed his interest in being present at 
the proceedings. The jury found Crosby 
guilty, and months later Crosby was 
found, arrested, and sentenced. 
The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit upheld the con-
victions. The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari. 
Rule 43 provides in pertinent part 
that "[t]he defendant shall be present. 
.. at every stage of the trial ... except 
as otherwise prOVided by this rule." 
Crosby, 113 S. Ct. at 751 (quoting Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 43(a))(emphasis added). 
The Rule further states that the defen-
dant is considered to have waived the 
right to be present if he is initially 
present and then voluntarily absent af-
ter the trial has conunenced. Crosby, 
113 S. Ct. at 751 (citing Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 43(b)). 
In its analysis, the Supreme Court 
examined the plain language of the Rule. 
The Court noted that the Rule contains 
a comprehensive listing of the circum-
stances under which the right to be 
present may be waived. Crosby, 113 S. 
Ct. at 751. The Rule's use of the limit-
ing phrase "except as otherwise pro-
vided" indicates that the list of situa-
tions in which the trial may proceed 
without the defendant is not exhaustive. 
ld. In that respect, the Court found the 
language to be unambiguous. ld. 
The Court also looked to the law as 
it existed at the time the Rule was 
. adopted. The general rule at conm10n 
law was that the personal presence of 
the defendant was essential to a valid 
trial and conviction on a felony charge, 
and a conviction was required to be set 
aside if the defendant was absent. ld. 
Recognizing that the notion that a fair 
trial could only take place if the jurors 
and witnesses testifying against the de-
fendant met face-to-face with the defen-
dant, the Court explained that this right 
to be present could not be waived. ld. 
The Court next examined the com-
mon law as it was applied in Diaz v. 
United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912). In 
that case, the Court held that the 
defendant's voluntary absence after the 
trial had begun did not nullify what had 
been done and did not prevent the 
completion of the trial. Crosby, 113 S. 
Ct. at 752 (citing Diaz, 223 U.S. at 
455). Instead, the defendant's absence 
operated as a waiver of his right to be 
present and left the Court free to pro-
ceed with the trial as ifhe were present. 
In Diaz, however, the Supreme Court 
did not address the situation in which a 
defendant fails to appear for the com-
mencement of the trial. Crosby, 113 S. 
Ct. at 752. 
The Supreme Court established im-
portant differences between flight be-
fore trial and flight during trial, and the 
Court emphasized several practical con-
siderations that supported its conclu-
sion. To begin with, the costs of sus-
pending a proceeding already under way 
would be greater than the costs of post-
poning a trial which has not yet begun. 
Because of this, the Court deemed the 
conunencement of trial a plausible place 
to make the distinction. ld. In addition, 
Rule43 treats mid-trial flight as a know-
ing and voluntary waiver of the right to 
be present. The initial presence of the 
defendant, asserted the Court, assures 
that any subsequent waiver is volun-
tary. Id. Furthermore, the Rule de-
prives the defendant of the option of 
terminating the trial if it seems that the 
verdict will go against him. Otherwise, 
the Cou rt stated, a defendant may choose 
to abscond during the trial so that it 
would be terminated. ld. at 752-53 . 
For that reason, a trial must be allowed 
to continue if the defendant is present at 
the beginning of the trial and later flees. 
In Crosby v. United States, the Su-
preme Court clarified the scope of Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 43. 
The language, history, and logic of the 
Rule all support a straightforward in-
terpretation that prohibits the trial in 
absentia of a defendant who is not 
present at the conunencement of trial. 
This holding makes it clear that if the 
defendant is present at the commence-
ment of the trial and later is absent, his 
absence is considered knowing and de-
liberate. Under these circumstances, 
his constitutional right to be present 
during his trial is considered waived. 
This assures that the Government, wit-
nesses, counsel, and court will not be 
kept waiting and that the defendant's 
right to a speedy trial is not abridged. In 
so holding, the Supreme Court clarified 
an arguably ambiguous rule oflaw. 
- Maria Ellena Carey 
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